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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
RAWLINGS,

*
•

REPLY BRIEF OF
CROSS-APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
«
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,

Case No. 860274-CA
»

Defendant/Cross-Respondent.
Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, Wendy Marie Christensen
Rawlings, by and through counsel, offers the following in
reply to the Brief of Cross-Respondent.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

Even though the Box Elder District Court is the court

of original jurisdiction, the jurisdictional requirements as
stated in UCA 78-45c-3 must still be met in order for the
court to modify a divorce decree as to custody and visitation
matters.

Those requirements are not met in this* action for

the Court to consider a modification of the Decree and the
District Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction.
2.

The District Court did not properly consider the

jurisdictional matters presented to it nor was the District
Court's exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the Utah
UCCJA.
3.

Even if it were considered that the District Court

did have jurisdiction, the District Court did not properly

consider

the convenient forum issues to determine if Utah

should exercise jurisdiction and the District Court abused its
discretion in retaining
4.

jurisdiction*

Even if it were determined that the District Court

had jurisdiction, and at the time properly exercised its
jurisdiction, jurisdiction should be transferred to Washington
pursuant to the Utah UCCJA due to the retirement of Judge Call
and Cross-Respondent's continued harassment through ongoing
litigation and

custody disputes.

ARGUMENTS
I.
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT DOES HOT MEET
THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
UTAH UCCJA IN ORDER TO RETAIN A JURISDICTION OVER THE MODIFICATION PETITION.

Although the Cross-Appellant may have indicated in her
original Brief that Utah may have jurisdiction because it is
the decree state, any such recognition is a misstatement and
Cross-Appellant strongly argues that the Box Elder District
Court, at the time of the Hearing on Cross-Respondent's Order
to Show Cause, did not have jurisdiction to hear any issues
relevant to custody and visitation as contemplated in the Utah
UCCJA.
Cross-Appellant fully recognizes that the Uniform Act
prefers the jurisdiction of the decree state over another
state in considering modification of custody decrees.
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However, it should be further noted that the Act contemplates
and requires a continued and ongoing jurisdictional review as
matters are brought before the courts regarding modification
of decrees.

So far, none of the cases cited in either Cross-

Appellant's Brief or Respondent's Brief are exactly on point
with the instant action.

Each of the cases deals with either

determining jurisdiction in an original decree, or with the
more common situation where one party has moved from the
decree state and requests the new home state, the non-decree
state, to modify the custody or visitation provisions of the
decree state.
In the instant action, the custodial parent has moved
from Utah, the decree state, to Washington, the non-decree
state.

Approximately eighteen

(IS) months later the non-

custodial parent (Cross-Respondent Mark Weiner) filed an Order
to Show Cause which included request for the Court to grant
him full custody of the parties' five children.

The Order to

Show Cause was served on the custodial parent, Wendy Rawlings,
in Washington.

In other words, the non-custodial parent

residing in the decree state is requesting the decree state to
modify the decree and is requiring the custodial parent to
return to the decree

state to defend and respond to any such

action.
As stated earlier, although the decree state is given
preference, that preference is not absolute, and the decree
state must still comply with the jurisdictional
of the UCCJA in order to modify the Decree.

3

requirements

A closely similar factual case is SZMYD v. SZMYD, Alaska,
641 P. 2d 14 (1982).

In that case, the parties were divorced

in Alaska in October of 1977 and the wife was granted custody
of the couple's one-year-old child.

A yea]? later, in the fall

of 1978, the wife and child moved to Washington State.

They

resided in Washington for two years and then moved to
California in early September, 1980.

On December 5, 1980, the

husband fxled a motion in Alaska, the decree state, to modify
the custody decree.

The wife moved to dismiss the action for

lack of jurisdiction, or alternatively, on the grounds that
Alaska was an inconvenient forum, which motion the Superior
Court denied.

The wife sought a review of that denial to the

Alaska Supreme Court which stayed the Superior Court
proceedings in order to hear her petition.
In reaching the first xssue, whether the Alaska trial
court had jurisdiction to hear the modification petition, the
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that even though the trial court
had the continuing right to modify custody decrees, the trial
court must always determine whether jurisdiction exists in
order to modify a decree (641 P.2d at 1 7 ) .

The Court

explained its ruling in the footnotes (No. 7) and stated:

This view is consistent with the uniform act.
RATNER, supra note 2, at 395:

See

"Section 14(a) apparently narrows the scope of
significant-connection, substantial-evidence, bestinterest jurisdiction by confining modification
jurisdiction to the initial-decree state if it meets
the prerequisites of the Act." (emphasis in
original).
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In our view, the UCCJA intended that continuing
jurisdiction in the original state must rest on some
significant connection with a party.
See Commissioners'
Note to UCCJA Section 14. This is frequently easy to
satisfy due to the "significant connection" basis for
jurisdiction found in Section 3(a)(2) of the UCCJA.
See
note 8, infra.
Alaska's version omits that basis and
thus even further narrows both initial and continuing
jurisdiction.
This view is also consistent with the language of
Section 14 of the UCCJA.
That provision prohibits a nondecree state from exercising modification jurisdiction
unless "the court which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this Act. . . . " (emphasis
added). [Statutory citation omitted!.
That modification
jurisdiction cannot be exercised absent compliance with
the jurisictional prerequisites of Section 3 [Statutory
citation omitted].
It is also consistent with the
uniform act's underlying purpose that the appropriate
forum make custodial determinations, assuming that the
"appropriate forum" is substantially defined by which
state meets the jurisdictional prerequisites.
Our approach is further consistent with the late
Professor Bodenheimer's view that the act was intended
"to strengthen the continuing jurisdiction of the state
of the initial decree...." Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at
214.
Reading the provisions together, once there is a
decree, one must look first to the issuing state to see
if it continues to have modification jurisdiction, i.e.,
does it still satisfy the act's jurisdictional
prerequisites?
UCCJA Section 14. If it does, the decreestate has jurisdiction, perhaps exclusively unless it
chooses to decline it on inconvenient forum grounds.
See
Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 216-19, 222-24.
(641 P. 2d
17).

As stated in the above-citation, Alaska does not include
in its jurisdictional requirements the significant-connection
test included in Utah's UCCJA, Section 78-45c-3(b), which
states as one basis that Utah may assume jurisdiction if:

(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the
child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this
state, and (ii) there is available in this state
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substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships;

In determining if the Alaska Superior Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3 of the Act (less the
equivalent of Utah's subsection

<l)(b) thereof) the Supreme

Court of Alaska held that since the wife had recently moved
from the State of Washington and was currently residing in
California, and since California was not the "home state," the
child not having resided in California for six months, no
other state had jurisdiction at the relevant time.

The Alaska

Supreme Court seems to have reluctantly held that the trial
court had jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection

<a)<4) of

Section 3 of the Act (LLC.A. 78-45c-3<1)<d)) because no other
state appeared to have jurisdiction.

It can be easily read

into the holding as dictum, that if the wife had either
continued to reside in Washington where she had resided for
two years, or if she

had resided in California for more than

six months at the time the petition to modify was filed in
Alaska, thus allowing another state to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements as the "home state," the Alaska
Supreme Court would have held that the trial court simply did
not have jurisdiction.

The Court did, however, conclude that

Alaska was an inconvenient forum and directed the trial court
to dismiss the petition to modify.

A review of the

inconvenient forum provisions will be discussed later in this
brief.
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In reviewing whether the District Court in the instant
action had jurisdiction, the Court must review Section 3 of
the UCCJA.

The jurisdictional requirements are stated as

follows:
78-45c-3.
Bases of jurisdiction in the State* <1> A
court of this state which is competent to decide child
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification decree if the
conditions as set forth in any of the following
paragraphs are met:
(a) This state <i> is the home state of the child
at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii)
had been the child's home state within six months before
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this state because of his removal or retention by a
person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in
this state?
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a
court of this state assume jurisdiction because <i) the
child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this
state, and <ii) there is available in this state
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships;
<c) The child is physically present in this state
and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he
has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or
abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent; or
<d)
<i> It appears that no other state would have
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in
accordance with paragraphs (a), <b) or <c), or another
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that this state is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the
best interest of the child that this court assume
jurisdiction*
(2) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of
subsection (1), physical presence in this state of the
child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of
this state to make a child custody determination,
(3) Physical presence of the child, while
desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to
determine his custody.
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It is clear from the facts that the only possible basis
for jurisdiction in Utah in the instant action would be
Section 78-45c-3<1)(b).

Utah is not the children's home state

(78-45c-3(a))? the children are not physically present in the
state and there is no claim for emergency jurisdiction

(78-45c-

3(1)(c); and Washington would have jurisdiction under the
prerequisites of the act since it is the home state and the
children physically reside in Washington

(78-45c-3(1)(d).

Therefore, for Utah to have jurisidiction, the requirements of
78-45c-3(1)(b) must be met, and there must be a finding of
"significant connections" and "substantial evidence. w
While it is conceded that Mark Weiner continues to reside
in Utah, it is strongly argued that the children no longer
have significant connections with the State of Utah, having,
at the time the Order to Show Cause was served, not resided in
Utah for eighteen months and having currently not resided in
Utah for almost three and one-half years*

There is no

"substantial evidence" concerning the children's present or
future care, protection, training and personal

relationships

in Utah and it is not in the best interest of the children for
Utah to assume jurisdiction.
The significant connection and substantial

evidence

requirements must further be considered in liqht of the stated
purposes of the Act, one of which is included in Section 7845c-l(c), which states:
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(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody
of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which
the child and his family have the CLOSEST CONNECTION and
where SIGNIFICANT evidence concerning his care,
protection, training and personal relationships is MOST
READILY AVAILABLE, and that courts of this state decline
the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his
family have a CLOSER CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER STATE;
(emphais added)

Many of the cases cited in Cross-Appt?llant' s Brief
further stress that the courts must consider which state has
the closest connection and in which stat^ the most significant
evidence is most readily available.

That was not done by the

District Court in the case at bar.
Also, as pointed out in Cross-Respondent's Brief, the
original drafters of the Act at least considered the
possibility of a situation similar to the instant action.

In

the Commissioners' Notes on Section 14 (which section deals
with modification provisions) the Reportepr states:

The fact that the court had previously considered
the case may be one factor favoring its continued
jurisdiction.
If, however, all of the persons involved
have moved away, or the contact with the state has
otherwise become slight, modification jurisdiction should
shift elsewhere.
(Emphasis added.)

In the instant action, since the children no longer have
the most significant connection with Utah and substantial
evidence concerning their future care, etc. cannot be found in
Utah, the provisions of 78-45c-3(1)<b) ar^ not satisfied.
Furthermore, since no other jurisdictional requirements are
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met under Section 3, the District Court did not have
jurisdiction to consider the matter of Cross-Respondent's
request for change of custody.

The rulings of the District

Court to the contrary should be reversed and the Order to Show
Cause requesting a change of custody should be dismissed.

II.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT EXERCISE
JURISDICTION CONSISTENT WITH THE UCCJA.

Cross-Appellant readily recognizes that prior to her
moving to Washington in June of 1984, the District Court had
heard many matters relative to visitation.

As indicated in

Cross-Appellant's previous brief and in the recitation of
facts in Cross-Respondent's brief, there had been almost a
dozen orders to show cause issued or heard in the slightly
more than two and one-half years from the time of the divorce
until Cross-Appellant moved.

Thereafter, the Court modified

the decree regarding visitation, which was consented to by
Cross-Appellant and was necessary due to the distance
involved.

That was scheduled on or about October 23, 1984,

approximately four months after Cross-App€?llant moved to
Washington.
Although the Court issued an order directing the clerk to
withhold child support payments pending receipt of an address
and phone number from Wendy Rawlings, at no time was Wendy
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Rawlings' counsel given notice of any sucjh motion nor did the
District Court afford Wendy Rawlings an opportunity of a
hearing to determine the facts alleged by Mark Weiner.

When

Wendy Rawlings* counsel became aware of the order and
contacted the Court, the matter was clarified.
Cross-Respondent's Order to Show Cause was issued on or
about October 23, 1985, but not served on Wendy Rawlings until
on or about December 3, 1985.
Since the Washington Court had initially exercised
emergency jurisdiction to hear some matters regarding
visitation in Washington, the Washington Court recognized that
the jurisdictional question would need to be ultimately
resolved and informed Cross-Appellant's Washington counsel
that it would contact the Utah Court to discuss the matter.
Pursuant to Section 14 of the UCCJA, the Washington Court
properly recognized that it should defer ^jurisdiction to Utah
unless Utah declined to exercise jurisdiction.

In contacting

Judge Call, Commissioner Gaddis of the Washington Court was
informed that Judge Call desired to retail jurisdiction and
thus, Washington elected to defer jurisdiction.

Commissioner

Gaddis stated in his January 13, 1986 Ord^r Declining
Jurisdiction that "Upon communication witty said Court it Cthe
Utah Court] has elected and determined to continue exercising
sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction. w
to Cross-Appellant's

Brief.)
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(See Addendum

Unfortunately, the Utah Court interpreted the discussion
between the two judges somewhat differently than the
Washington Court.

In his Statement and Order dated December

23, 1985, a copy o± which is attached to Brief of CrossAppellant at Page Al, Judge Call stated "... Commissioner
Gaddis of said Washington Court contacted this court declining
to accept jurisdiction, noted the problems the minor children
were having because of the visitation fights, and urged this
court to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing,
adjusting or modifying the custody and visitation orders*"
In Judge Call's subsequent Memorandum, dated February 26,
1986, in response to Wendy Rawlings' request to partially set
aside Judge Christoffersen's Memorandum Decision of December
23, 1985, refusing to transfer jurisdiction allegedly

because

Washington had declined to take jurisdiction. Judge Call
simply stated that the Memorandum Decision of Judge
Christoffersen appeared to be "Accurately based on the
Washington Court's conclusion that Utah was the proper
forum. n

At no time has Judge Call issued any findings of fact

or conclusions of law or otherwise clarified his ruling or
even given any basis for his decision to retain jurisdiction*
Cross-Appellant's Washington attorney has requested further
clarification from Commissioner Gaddis, which clarification
will be provided to this Court when received.

Cross-Appellant

argues that the District Court failed to adequately consider
the provisions of the Utah UCCJA and that the court's exercise
of jurisdiction was not consistent with the Utah UCCJA.
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In HEPNER v. HEFNER, 469 N.E.2d 780 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.
1984), the Indiana Appeals Court ruled that the Indiana trial
court lacked the power to assume jurisdiction over a
modification petition because the trial court failed to
seriously address the issue of its jurisdiction under the
UCCJA.

In that case, the parties were divorced in Indiana

some time prior to 1983*

Over the next several years

following the divorce, petitions and cross-petitions were
filed alleging various contemptuous acts regarding visitation
and support.

The wife and child subsequently moved from

Indiana to Illinois and had resided in Illinois for over six
months when the wife petitioned the Indiana court to terminate
the husband's visitation.

When that order was denied in

Indiana, the wife filed a similar motion in Illinois,
whereafter the husband filed a petition in Indiana requesting
that the wife be again held in contempt of court.
Although there is extensive reference to the record and
the trial court's discussion with the wife's attorney
regarding the provisions of the UCCJA, indicating that the
court was attempting to base its decision claiming
jurisdiction pursuant to the Act, the Indiana Appeals Court
ruled that the trial court had not properly considered the
issue of jurisdiction, both as to simultaneous proceedings and
as to inconvenient forum consideration.

jThe Appeals Court

stated:

The [trial court! clearly failed to follow the Act.
It was correct in its statements concerning the purpose
13

of the UCCJL.
However, we would refer the court to other
policies behind the act which are to:
Eavoid
jurisdictional competition, promote cooperation with the
courts of other states, assure that litigation concerning
the custody of a child take place in the state with the
closest connection and most significant evidence and to
decline jurisdiction when a child and his family have a
closer connection with another state, and to promote and
expand the exchange of information and other forms of
mutual assistance between the courts.J H

The District Court in the instant action also failed to
follow the Act and further failed to even consider the
purposes or provisions of the Act by nerver giving any
statements, reasons, or hints why the Corut ruled that it had
jurisdiciton.

III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE INCONVENIENT FORUM PROVISIONS OF THE ACT.
Another factor which needs to be pointed out in showing
that the trial court was not exercising jurisdiction
consistent with the Act is the court's failure to address or
even consider the inconvenient forum issues as required in UCA
78-45c-7, which states in relevant to part:
<i) A court which has jurisdiction under this act
to make an initial or modification decree may decline to
exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree
if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a
custody determination under the circumstances of the case
and that a court of another state is a more appropriate
forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made
upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a party or
a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum,
the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the
child that another state assume jurisdiction.
For this
purpose it may take into account the following factors,
among others:
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's
home state;
14

(b) If another state has a clqser connection with
the child and his family or with the child and one or
more of the contestants;
<c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is more readily available in
another state;
<d) If the parties have agreed on another forum
which is no less appropriate;
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of
this state would contravene any of the purposes stated in
section 78-45c-l.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court of
another state and exchange information pertinent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more
appropriate court and that a forum will be available to
the parites.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient
forum and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it
may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody
proceeding be promptly commenced in another named state
or upon any other conditions which may be just and
proper, including the condition that a moving party
stipulate his consent and submission to the jurisdiction
of the other forum.

As indicated earlier, the Alaska Supreme Court in SZMYD,
supra, looked very closely at the inconvenient forum issues in
determining whether Alaska should exercise its jurisdiction.
The Alaska court noted that the purpose ojf the inconvenient
forum provisions were to, "Encourage jurisdictional restraint
whenever another state appears to be in a better position to
determine custody of a child."
Section 7."

641 P.2d at 19.

Commissioners' Note to UCCJA
The Alaska Supreme Court had

remanded the case to the trial court for a statement of
reasons why the trial court had not granted the motion since
it was difficult to determine where there *iad been an abuse of
discretion without such reasons.

15

After remand, the trial court provided the following
reasons:

1. The State of Washington, which was the child's
prior home state, was not a convenient forum since none
of the parties at the time of the initiation for this
request for custody modification lived in Washington.
The mother and child living in California for only a
short time and the father having his residence in the
State of Alaska.
California was not the home state of
the child.
2.
The child was born in the State of Alaska and
lived in Alaska for almost three years. The child has
had more contact with the State of Alaska than
California.
3. The father has; had more contact with Alaska than
the mother has had with California.
4.
More people involved with the child were from
the State of Alaska than the State of California.
5. Substantially, the relations on both the
father's and the mother's side were living in Alaska in
the Fairbanks area at the time of the request for custody
modification.
The only people involved in California
were the mother and child.
6.
The objection by the mother as to the cost is
not a factor since the father is required to pay the cost
of transportation as well as arrangements for the mother
while in Alaska."
641 P.2d at 19-20.

The Supreme Court of Alaska then indicated that other
jurisdictions, on substantially similar facts, had stayed or
dismissed proceedings in favor of a more appropriate forum.
The court noted that the underlying theme in those decisions
was the focus on the child's situation and connections with a
particular forum; that is, which forum is best in light of the
child's best interest?

The court then analyzed the decision

of WILLIAM L. v. MICHELLE P., 99 Misc.2d 346, 416 N.Y.S.2d 477
(Fam.Ct. 1979), where a New York court concluded that New York
should not exercise its jurisdiction even though the decree
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had been entered in New York, because th^ children and mother
had not been in New York for approximately four years.
The Alaska Supreme Court then reviewed the facts relevant
to its case, including home state, closer connections, source
of evidence, relative hardship, and contravention of UCCJA
purposes, and held that it was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion not to decline to exercise jurisdiction.

The

Alaska Supreme Court held that Californiaj was the more
appropriate forum in light of the child's best interest, even
though the child had only resided in California, at the time
of the hearings, for approximtely six months.
Likewise, the Louisiana Appellate Court in MILLER v.
MILLER, 463 So.2d 939 (La.App. 2 Cir. 198^) held that
Louisiana was not the appropriate forum since Louisiana had
not been the child's home state for over four years and in
spite of the fact that the child had visited in Louisiana with
his father on numerous occasions.

In that case, the parties

were divorced in Florida after which the father moved to
Louisiana.

The mother then moved with th^ child to

Massachusetts.

The father thereafter sought to modify the

Florida decree in Louisiana.

The Appeals Court held that even

though Florida was no longer the child's home state, Louisiana
was not the most appropriate forum to determine custody
matters since the child had closer and more recent significant
connections with Florida.

The court also held that the trial

court had failed to make the statutory inquiries regarding the
jurisdictional questions and further addec|:
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The applicant [the custodial mother] should not be
required to defend modification of the Florida custody
decree in a state which had not been the child's home
state in over four years. Ms. Miller had the right or
privilege under the forwarded decree to move herself and
the child to Massachusetts.
Ms. Miller should not be
required to litigate in Louisiana simply because Florida
no longer may be the home state.

In the instant action, Cross-Appellant has cited numerous
specific reasons why Washington is the most convenient forum
to determine issues regarding custody and visitation of the
children
31).

(See Brief of Cross-Appellant, Argument II, Page 26-

In addition, Mark Weiner has had counsel appear in his

behalf at Washington proceedings.

He travels to Washington

numerous times during the year for visitation
court has allowed travel expenses)

(for which the

and has had frequent

contact with school teachers and officials, church and other
acquaintances in the Seattle area.
Rawlings is in Utah perhaps one

In contrast, Wendy

or two times a year.

The

trial court's failure to even consider those matters, let
alone issue findings of fact relative to such issues, is an
obvious abuse of discretion and a failure by the court to
exercise jurisdiction consistent with the purposes and intent
of the Utah UCCJA.

IV.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH UCCJA
DO NOT
ALLOW THAT JURISDICTION BE USED AS HARASSMENT

As stated in UCA Section 78-45c-l(d), one of the purposes
of the UCCJA is to "discourage continuing controversies over
18

child custody in the interest of greater stability of home
environment and of secure family relationships with the
child.

This has been emphasized in the most recent opinions

of our Supreme Court dealing with petitions to modify divorce
decrees to change custody, from HOGGE v. HOGGE, 694 P. 2d 51
(Utah 1982) through KRAMER v KRAMER,
15, 1987).

57 Utah Adv.Rep. 14 (May

Pursuant to what has now becqme the majority

opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in determining

modification

child custody orders, the trial court must first make the
threshhold determination whether there has been a significant
change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the reopening of
the custody decree, or as stated in KRAMER,

supra:

"The change in circumstances threshhold is high to
discourage frequent petitions for modification of custody
decrees.
The test was designed to 'protect the custodial
parent from harassment by repeated litigation,' and to
protect the child from 'ping-pong custody w a r s . / w
(See
HOGGE v HOGGE, 694 P.2D 51, 53, 54 (Utah 1982).

The Court further stated:

"The essential premise of our rtcent child custody
cases is the view that stable custody arrangements are of
critical importance to the child's proper development
[citations omitted].
The two part HOGGE test is founded
upon that premise.
No matter how well intentioned,
changes in custody could do more harm than good
[citations omitted].
For this reason when a trial court
is asked to determine whether there has been a change of
circumstances sufficient to warrant Reopening a custody
decree, ordinarily it must focus exclusively on the
parenting ability of the custodial parent and the
functioning of the established custodial relationships."
57 UAR at 15.

In order for the trial court to be consistent with the
rulings from our Supreme Court dealing with petitions to
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change custody, it is essential that the court first determine
if there has been the necessary change in circumstances by
receiving testimony dealing with the parenting ability of the
custodial parent and the functioning of the established
custodial relationship.

That can only be accomplished

where

there is evidence available to provide such testimony.

That

testimony cannot be provided to the court when the custodial
parent and the children have not resided in the state for a
significant period of time, such as in the instant action.
At the hearing on Defendant's

request for change of

custody, Defendant called six witnesses, Wendy Rawlings,
himself, Nels Sather, Charles Burbank, Dr. Kim Qpenshaw, and
Dr. Jack M. Reiter.

Other than the parties to this action,

only Dr. Reiter had had any substantial contact with Plaintiff
or the children in excess of

two years.

Furthermore, Dr.

Reiter was a psychiatrist residing in Seattle, Washington and
appointed by the Washington Court to do home studypsychological evaluation, and was familiar to the Washington
Court.

In other words. Defendant brought his primary

witness

from Washington to a hearing in Utah.
Plaintiff was only able to have herself, her husband, and
her parents, Wendell and Rosalee Christensen, testify on her
behalf.

Plaintiff was not able to afford the expense of

bringing other therapists, counselors, school and church
officials, and other people to testify.
The same will be true for any future hearings.
District Court is simply unable to make the kinds of
20

The

determinations as is required by the Utah Supreme Court and in
compliance with the Utah UCCJA.
Furthermore r

as noted earlier, Defendant has filed

numerous orders to show cause requiring Plaintiff to appear in
court.

After Defendant originally filed the appeal in this

action, Defendant again filed a Petition to Modify the decree
requesting custody, which Petition has been stayed pursuant to
court order at Plaintiff's request pending an outcome of this
appeal*

In other words, if this Court were to uphold the

District Court's decision regarding jurisdiction, Plaintiff
will again be forced to defend herself ih the District Court
regarding the petition for change of custody, which is an
absolute contravention of the purposes of

the Utah UCCJA.

As stated in RATNER, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND
JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATION

(a)

Effeciive-Litigation

Values

vs. The Territorial Imperative; (b) The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 75 N.W.U.L.Rev. 363, 398-99 (1980), the
optimum-evidence home-state [Washington] need not be
subordinated to the decree-state CUtah3 jurisdiction in all
situations.

"Only when concealment of trie child prevents

enforcement by the winner within six months should antiharassment require the apparent home state to yield
modification jurisdiction to another forum. n

Ratner also

indicates that removal, retention, and deprival of visitation
rights can be inhibited through the enforcement of the Act in
the home-state without the subordination of the home-state
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jurisdiction by a blanket preference to the decree-state that
impairs the access to evidence and the anti-harassment
purposes of

the Act.

(See RATNER, supra, 398)

It should also be further noted that Judge Call, since
the hearing on

this action, has retired from the bench.

Therefore, any claims that the District Court had made prior
rulings and was therefore familiar with the action, although
never specifically stated by the court, no longer have any
force and effect and are completely moot.

A new judge in Utah

would have no better insight or ability to decide visitation
and custody matters than would a Washington judge.

However,

since the children reside in Washington, since the most
significant and closest connections with the children are in
Washington, and since the most substantial evidence concerning
the children's current and future welfare is found in
Washington, Washington is in a much better position than is a
Utah court to make any determinations regarding any such
modifications.

Therfore, this matter should be transferred to

the Washington court for further consideration of any custody
or visitation matters.

CONCLUSION

In order for the District Court to have heard any action
regarding custody and visitation, it was incumbent upon the
court to make a determination whether it was vested with
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jurisdiction.

Although the District Court felt that it had

jurisdiction, at no time was any reason given for such a
ruling or any findings of fact or conclusions of law issued by
the court.

Even had there been such, it is clear pursuant to

UCA 73-45c-3 that the District Court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the action.
Even if it were held that the District Court did have
jurisdiction, it is abundantly clear that it should not have
exercised any such jurisdiction but should have deferred to
the jurisdiction of the Washington pursuant to UCA 78-45c-7
since all of the factors indicated therein for determining the
most convenient forum clearly favored the Washington court.
None of

the factors favor the Utah Court.

Finally, even if this court had jurisdiction at such time
and had been the most convenient forum, since the trial judge
has retired from the bench, and since Defendant/CrossRespondent has indicated that he will continue to pursue his
quest to obtain custody of the children at all costs,
including the children's well being, it is incumbent upon this
court to transfer jurisdiction of custody and visitation
matters in this action to the Washington court in accordance
with the purposes and provisions of the Utah UCCJA.
Therefore, this court should reverse the ruling of the
District Court regarding jurisdiction and/or transfer
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jurisdiction of custody and visitation matters to the
Washington court.

-£-

DATED this _(£_

day

oi December, 1987.

lintiff/Cross?llant Wendy Rawlings

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT to Larry E.
Jones, HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, 175 East First North,
Logan, Utah 84321 and deposited tJ>e same in the U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid envelope this „Zj- d a Y 0 * December, 1987.
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